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CREDIT RATIONING IN THE POLISH FARM SECTOR:  
A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS BASED ON SURVEY DATA 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to empirically detect credit rationing of Polish farms. Based on cross-sectional 
survey data and motivated by a microeconomic farm household model, this effort is pursued by a methodology 
consisting of three interrelated steps. These steps include the analysis of qualitative survey data regarding farm-
ers’ experience with bank credit, based on this an econometric estimation of internal shadow prices of credit for 
the credit constrained sub-sample of respondents, and finally an investigation of interdependencies between 
determinants of consumption and production that should be influenced by the presence of a binding credit con-
straint. 
The results of the empirical analysis consistently suggest that among the observed randomly selected Polish 
farms more than 40 percent of borrowers experience pronounced credit rationing by rural banks. These farms 
display internal shadow prices of the credit constraint of on average 190 percent net of principal. Shadow prices 
are significantly different from individual effective interest rates for credit that account for loan specific transac-
tion costs. In the group of credit constrained farms, household characteristics could be proven to have a signifi-
cant effect on output supply. This is evidence for a violation of separability between production and consump-
tion decisions and thus lends empirical support to the existence of a binding credit constraint. Overall, credit 
constrained farm households own less and rent more land than the average, operate with a high capital intensity 
with regard to land, tend to have a poor credit history, and engage intensively in intra-village conversation. Gen-
erous government support via interest rate subsidisation apparently contributed little to alleviate credit rationing 
of farms in Poland. 
Keywords: agriculture credit, credit rationing, interest subsidy, microeconometrics, Poland. 
1  INTRODUCTION
1 
Among the Central and Eastern Europe Candidate Countries Poland supposedly is the one 
where the agricultural sector poses the most difficult adjustment problems in the course of EU 
accession. Not only do serious structural deficiencies call the sector’s international competi-
tiveness into question (PETRICK et al. 2002). Also the gap in living standards between urban 
and rural groups of the Polish population gives rise to worries. It already brought about an 
increasingly negative attitude among rural citizens towards the whole accession process, 
which may well endanger social peace in the entire country. The results of the most recent 
parliamentary elections which strengthened extreme anti-EU positions supported by parties 
with a largely rural clientele bear lively testimony to this. All this will make negotiations on 
the agricultural chapter of the accession talks scheduled for early 2002 even more compli-
cated and politically sensitive. 
Development of the Polish farm sector is thus of urgent necessity. Right from the beginning 
of market reforms, the Polish government introduced a number of policy measures to achieve 
this goal. Besides trade policy and output price support measures, interest subsidies figured 
prominently over recent years and accounted for about 38% of the agricultural budget in 1999 
(not regarding expenses for the farmers’ social insurance fund; see MRiRW 2000 and OECD 
2000). These subsidies are granted both on operational and investment loans extended by 
commercial banks. Intervention on credit markets can thus be regarded as a major instrument 
of the Polish government to achieve its political objectives.  
Is there an economic justification for continued government intervention in rural credit mar-
kets? In fact, it is often claimed that farm households in underdeveloped rural areas are credit 
rationed by formal lenders in the sense that they cannot borrow as much as needed to finance 
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inputs, investment, and indispensable consumption expenditures. Contemporary contract the-
ory argues that banks are not interested in these clients because it is particularly difficult to 
overcome information asymmetries and resulting screening, monitoring, and enforcement 
problems: clients are poor, have few assets to collateralise, act in an especially risk-prone 
environment, and give rise to high transaction costs (BINSWANGER and ROSENZWEIG 1986). 
The process of transition to a market economy tends to worsen these problems (SWINNEN and 
GOW 1999). Hence the question arises quite naturally whether there is any rationale for gov-
ernment intervention on rural credit markets in order to improve living standards and foster 
structural change. However, a second question is which type of intervention is desirable. No 
conclusive policy recommendations can be derived from theory alone (BESLEY 1994). In ad-
dition, experience both from developing and OECD countries suggests that subsidies on inter-
est rates often failed to mitigate credit rationing of rural borrowers, and that governmental 
credit programs frequently did not achieve their stated objectives (see e.g. the collection of 
articles on developing countries in ADAMS et al. 1984 and BRÜMMER and LOY 2000 for a 
quite recent study on Germany). 
A closer examination of the rural financial market in Poland appears thus to be worthwhile. In 
my view, the foremost step to formulate serious policy advice in the present situation is to 
find out (a) whether after a decade of interest subsidies Polish farmers are (still) credit ra-
tioned at all and (b) if yes, how severely this rationing affects current production outcomes. 
The aim of this paper is to give a methodologically sound answer to both questions. Its objec-
tive is to outline a theoretically consistent methodology to detect and analyse credit rationing 
of farm households and to apply this method to cross-sectional survey data of 431 Polish 
farms interviewed in 2000. The paper is thus also understood as an effort to bridge the ob-
served gap in the literature (HOBBS 1997) between increasing theoretical interest in market 
imperfections on the one hand and empirical scrutiny that puts these concepts to the test on 
the other. 
At this stage of the research, emphasis is on credit rationing with regard to working capital 
loans used for the financing of current production. Only loans with a maturity of less than 12 
months are regarded, and investment loans are generally not considered in the following. 
The findings of this paper are based on three major indicators. The first is a qualitative one 
representing the subjective experience of credit rationing as stated by the respondents of the 
survey. Determinants of this credit rationing status are examined by a Probit regression. At 
the heart of the second indicator lies the notion of the shadow price of the credit constraint. 
This shadow price provides a measure of the internal value of credit within a given farm 
household, which can be compared with any external measure of capital scarcity, e.g. the 
market interest rate for credit. Neo-classical theory suggests that in the absence of rationing, 
the marginal value of credit within the farm should equal its market price. In case the latter is 
significantly exceeded by the former, this is regarded as evidence for substantial market dis-
tortions and a thus prevailing credit constraint. The shadow price is calculated by estimating a 
reduced-form output supply equation. The third indicator looks at violations of separability 
between the household’s consumption and production decisions in the presence of market 
failure. If there are binding constraints in credit access, production outcomes of the farm firm 
should be partly determined by household characteristics. This claim is subjected to an em-
pirical test in the following. 
The methodology of the subsequent analysis draws on several contributions in the literature. 
The most important one is FEDER et al. (1990) who examine the relation between credit and 
productivity in rural China. FEDER et al. were among the first to rely on specific survey data 
to ease the estimation of reduced-form output supply equations. Two other related papers are   4
CARTER (1989) and SIAL and CARTER (1996) with applications to Nicaragua and Pakistan. 
SIAL and CARTER to my knowledge were the first to use the notion of a ‘shadow price of capi-
tal’ in an econometric analysis of credit market failure. The present research attempts to learn 
the lessons from these papers by taking econometric problems of endogeneity and selectivity 
bias fully into account. Furthermore, in contrast to most of the previous contributions, flexible 
functional forms are employed in the estimations presented here. LOPEZ (1984) and BENJAMIN 
(1992) are two papers explicitly investigating the non-separability hypothesis in the house-
hold model framework, however with regard to labour markets in Canada and Indonesia. The 
following is an attempt to transfer their considerations to the credit market problem in Poland. 
The paper proceeds in several steps. Chapter   2 outlines theoretical framework and research 
methodology of the analysis. In Chapter   3, the empirical strategy is presented and a number of 
potential problems in implementing this strategy are discussed. Chapter   4 contains the results 
of the econometric estimations, and Chapter   5 draws a number of conclusions. 
2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter theoretically examines the behaviour of a farm household facing a potential 
credit constraint. The model analyses household behaviour in a static fashion inspired by the 
literature on agricultural household modelling. In the following, I concentrate on the producer 
side of the household to study how the credit constraint affects production decisions, while 
consumption decisions are only depicted rudimentarily. However, the following can be seen 
as representing a subsystem of a full household model which includes consumption choices as 
endogenous variables. See SADOULET and DE JANVRY (1995, pp. 149-163) for a fuller exposi-
tion of this type of models. 
Consider a farm household producing one output y ≥ 0 (with a given price p) with i inputs 
xi ≥ 0 (with given prices wi). I assume that the farmer maximises one period’s profit π, i.e. the 
difference between revenue and variable costs, by making decisions about the respective 
quantities of y and xi. A number of fixed factors z
q are employed for production, e.g. land and 
machinery. Due to the seasonality of production, the farmer has a liquidity problem, since 
inputs have to be purchased prior to harvest. To do these purchases, the farmer can borrow 
external funds. These funds, however, are limited by a credit constraint K, which denotes an 
exogenously given amount of maximum credit the household can borrow in the respective 
period. Due to this potentially binding credit constraint, farm production decisions compete 
with consumption choices of the household with respect to liquid funds. Consumption choices 
determined by household characteristics z
h, e.g. the size and composition of the farmer’s fam-
ily, require a liquidity contribution of the farm, denoted M. The contribution may principally 
also be negative, i.e. the household provides liquidity to finance production (e.g. as a result of 
public transfers). Consequently, decisions concerning the use of liquidity for both production 
and consumption have to be made simultaneously, though I have omitted the formal presenta-
tion of consumption choices for the sake of simplicity. The effect of this non-separability is 
that production decisions cannot be made independent of consumption choices under the 
binding credit constraint, which may or may not be binding, depending on the respective in-
flows and outflows of liquidity. The constrained optimisation problem is thus characterised as 
follows: 
(1)  ∑ − =
i
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q
i z y x g , a given production technology, and 
(3) 0 ) ( ≥ − −∑
h
i
i i z M x w K , the credit constraint. 
The production technology is assumed to be strictly increasing in xi and locally strongly con-
cave in xi. According to (3), credit may be used either for productive or consumptive pur-
poses. 
There is a rich body of theoretical literature investigating the causes of credit rationing and 
potential countermeasures. As noted above, the credit constraint may be due to unresolved 
problems of adverse selection or moral hazard as a result of information asymmetries on the 
credit market (STIGLITZ and WEISS 1981). The probability that (3) is binding for a given 
household will decrease with increasing availability of signalling and/or screening devices to 
overcome existing information asymmetries. Apart from a sufficient performance and satis-
factorily risk exposition of the credit funded project (which is implicitly assumed to be given 
in the formulation of (1)), availability of collateral, individual characteristics and skills of the 
borrower, and a positive credit history are assumed to be among the most important devices to 
avoid credit rationing (for a theoretical analysis see BESTER 1987 and DIAMOND 1989). Ac-
cording to (3), whether the credit constraint is binding may also be due to household charac-
teristics 
h z , which in turn determine M. 
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with the endogenous variables y, xi, λ, and η. Since (3) is an inequality which may or may not 
be binding, I use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this constraint. The first-order conditions for 
an interior maximum are thus: 
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(8b)  0 ≥ η , 
(8c) 0 ) ( ≥ − −∑
h
i
i i z M x w K . 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (8a) to (8c) allow that either the credit constraint is effective in 
which (8b) becomes an inequality and (8c) an equality, or the constraint is not effective, in 
which the reverse holds. η is the shadow price of the credit constraint, which is nonnegative 
in any case. Ceteris paribus, it denotes the marginal effect of an increase of the credit con-








If binding, (3) hence represents an additional constraint of production which in turn intro-
duces an inefficiency compared to the benchmark case without effective credit limit. 
In reality, K is only observed if it is binding, in which case it is identical to the actual credit 
amount borrowed. The survey data allows the distinction between farms for which K is bind-
ing and for which it is not. This qualitative information is the first indicator used to assess the 
presence of credit rationing in the sample. 
The basic idea of the second indicator is to look whether the marginal profit increase suffices 
to pay the market interest rate for credit including repayment of the principal. Whether a 
given farm household is in fact credit rationed in the sense of an inefficient allocation of re-
sources depends on the following comparison. I regard the farm household as credit rationed 
if: 
(10)  r > η ,  
with r the interest rate for credit (including repayment of the principal). 
To see how an estimate of η can be obtained, first have a look at the profit function under the 
binding credit constraint  * π  in its fully reduced form, i.e. only depending on exogenous vari-
ables (compare the approach in SADOULET and DE JANVRY 1995, p. 160): 
(11) ) , , , , ( * * K z z w p
h q
i π π = . 
This equation would already allow an estimation of the effect of K on  * π . However, to ease 
the empirical analysis, I go one step further and derive the output supply equation of the sin-
gle output y* under the binding credit constraint by virtue of Hotelling’s lemma: 
(12)  ) , , , , ( *
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In the case of a single output, the marginal effect of an increase in K on y* displays the mar-
ginal productivity of the credit constraint. However, in its empirical multi-product variant, y* 
is total output supply of the farm aggregated by the farm-specific price vector, hence gross 
revenue of the farm. Product prices thus take the double function of exogenous decision vari-





 equals the shadow price of the credit con-
straint η, since additional revenue ceteris paribus is identical to additional profit. To switch 
from profit to output supply has a number of advantages for empirical implementation: reve-
nues are always positive; furthermore they are less data demanding and to a lesser extent sub-
ject to measurement error than profits. As a consequence, a greater variety of functional forms 
can be employed and results are less likely to be biased by attenuation. 
Formulations (11) and (12) show most clearly that under the binding credit constraint, pro-
duction decisions cannot be analysed in separation from the household characteristics z
h. In 
this case, separability of production and consumption decisions thus breaks down. An empiri-
cally significant influence of household characteristics on production outcomes consequently 
constitute the third indicator of credit rationing.   7
3  EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1  Database 
The data source for the analyses in this paper is the IAMO Poland farm survey 2000, which is 
a cross-sectional farm survey conducted in the boundaries of the former Szczecin, Tarnów, 
and Rzeszów voivodships existing prior to the administrative reform of 1. January 1999. The 
survey was carried out in 2000 and contains mainly data related to the economic outcomes of 
the year 1999.  
The survey is based on a random sample of farms in the database of the official extension 
service. The database consists only of farms that show at least some degree of commercialisa-
tion and market integration and that account for the bulk of the traded agricultural produce in 
the research area. The final sample consists of 464 farms; 120 from Szczecin, 108 from 
Tarnów, and 236 from Rzeszów. For the subsequent analysis, 33 observations had to be ex-
cluded due to extreme leverage of outlying data points. Within the given geographic bounda-
ries of the three voivodships, the sample is stratified in one stage. The strata are identical with 
administrative districts (powiat). Further details on sampling issues, organisation of data col-
lection and a reprint of the questionnaire can be found in PETRICK (2001). 
3.2  Empirical strategy for detecting credit rationing 
The survey respondents were classified in borrowers and non-borrowers of working capital 
loans (Table 1). Approximately three quarters of respondents did not borrow any working 
capital at all. This does not necessarily mean that they were not active on credit markets at all, 
since investment loans are not considered in this study. Among the borrowers of working 
capital loans, 80 percent obtained a loan with subsidised interest (not shown in the table). 
Credit recipients were asked whether they would have liked to borrow more at the same inter-
est rate. If so, they were classified as ‘constrained’, which applies to almost half of the bor-
rowers. This is the group of interest for the analysis of the shadow price of the credit con-
straint, since for them the amount borrowed is identical with the credit limit, which in turn is 
assumed to be exogenous to the production decision. 
The probability of falling in the group of constrained borrowers can be analysed by the fol-
lowing stochastic model: 
(13)  l l u k + = l γz *.   
Table 1:   Importance of rationing in the sample (working 
capital loans) 
Variable Observations Percent 
Borrowers constrained  48 11.1 
Borrowers unconstrained  67 15.6 
Borrowers total  115 26.7 
Non-borrowers 316 73.3 
All respondents  431 100.0 
Note:    For definitions of subgroups see text. 
Source:  Own calculations.   8
In this model, kl* is a dichotomous (1, 0) variable indicating whether observation l is a credit 
constrained borrower or not.  l z represents a vector of explaining variables (such as household 
and production characteristics). γ is a vector of parameters, while ul is a random error term.  
For the credit constrained subgroup, the shadow price of the credit constraint is obtained by 
estimating (12) as a stochastic relation: 
(14)  l
h q
i l l K z z w p y y ε + = ) , , , , ( * * , with  l ε  a random error term. 










ˆ η , with  *) ( l y E  the expectation of * l y . 
If the specification of  (.) * l y  is sufficiently rich, η ˆ l can be estimated as a function of other 
variables. Consequently, the value of η ˆ l can be computed for each farm household l and then 
compared with the observed interest rates. This can be done by regressing estimated shadow 
prices on interest rates as follows (see a similar application in JACOBY 1993): 
(16)  l l l e r b b + + = 2 1 ˆ η , with el a random error term. 
The statistical test of credit rationing in the sense of a market inefficiency then involves the 
null hypothesis (b1, b2) = (0, 1), which can be subjected to an F- test procedure. 
The above model (14) also allows to test the assumption of non-separability between produc-
tion and consumption decisions in the household (see comparable studies on labour allocation 
by LOPEZ 1984 and BENJAMIN 1992). The strategy is straightforward: In case that the credit 
constraint (3) is in fact not relevant for the households in the sample, it will turn out that 
household characteristics z
h have no significant effect on output in (14). If, in turn, the pa-
rameters of the z
h variables are significantly different from zero (as tested by the standard t-
test), separability is rejected and the credit constraint must be regarded as important. 
3.3  Problems due to the non-experimental nature of the data 
In empirical applications, the implementation of (14) faces a number of problems which are 
relevant for the specification of the model and the choice of the functional form. These prob-
lems arise as a result of the non-experimental nature of the data, in which, unlike in a labora-
tory experiment, environmental conditions cannot be controlled. I will discuss them in turn, 
together with the envisaged solutions.  
First, there is the general danger of simultaneity bias arising from a correlation between K and 
ε , since one usually would regard K as an endogenous household choice similar to other in-
put variables. However, if K is binding, it is reasonable to assume that simultaneity disappears 
because the amount of credit used in the farm household is exogenously imposed (FEDER et 
al. 1990). In this case, model (14) is correctly specified. Therefore, estimation can consis-
tently only be done for the constrained households which I have identified by utilising the 
specific survey data on that issue (see Section   3.2).  
Unfortunately, this sample separation does not come without a cost. It introduces a selectivity 
bias, since households will probably not randomly be selected in constrained and non-
constrained ones. It is thus necessary to take the selection process as such into account. For-
mally, equations (13) and (14) form a system in which (14) is only observed if kl*=1: 
(17)  l
h q
i l l K z z w p y y ε + = ) , , , , ( * *  iff  0 > + l u l γz .   9
In this system,  l ε  and ul are supposed to have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means 
and correlation ρ. I retain the unspecified notation of  (.) * l y since the function may be non-
linear in parameters. 
A second problem concerns the availability of appropriate data for the estimations. As is fre-
quently the case in cross sectional data, price variation across households turned out to be 
insufficient to produce significant estimates of parameters in the current sample. To deal with 
this, I dropped the price parameters and estimated a function only dependent on fixed factors 
and the credit constraint K. 
3.4  Specification of the model 
Equation (17) constitutes an incidentally truncated system, since (13) determines how (14) is 
truncated. These types of models can be conveniently estimated by a two-step procedure due 
to HECKMAN (1979). The first step is the estimation of (13) which already yields relevant in-
formation of its own. I estimated (13) as a Probit model which due to its non-linear transfor-
mation requires the application of Maximum Likelihood techniques. Parameters of this model 
are then used to calculate so-called Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR’s), which are included in the 
second-stage linear regression of (14) as additional correction factors. To allow valid hy-
pothesis testing, the subsequently shown t-values were modified in order to account for het-
eroscedasticity and the use of estimates for the IMR.  
The variables employed in the regression equations are shown in Table 2. A dummy variable 
determined by survey responses as explained above serves as dependent variable in the first-
stage Probit regression. The following explanatory variables were chosen (expected signs are 
given in parentheses): Land owned (-) and land rented from private persons (+) were taken as 
indicators of the volume of collateralisable wealth, adult males (?) and females (?) as house-
Table 2:   Description of variables used in the regressions (total sample) 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum  Valid ob-
servations
Dependent variables    
Credit constrained (dummy)  .1 .3 .0  1.0  415
Aggregate output supply (ths zł) 55.2 60.3 .6  432.1  406
Independent variables    
Total land cultivated (ha)  22.4 30.2 .0  200.0  431
Total land owned (ha)  13.5 16.8 .0  142.9  431
Land rented from private persons (ha)  2.4 5.7 .0  52.5  431
Capital stock of farm net of land (ths zł) 202.6 160.0 3.3  865.0  431
Credit volume (ths zł) 2.4 7.7 .0  80.0  431
Adult males in household (no)  1.7 .9 .0  5.0  431
Adult females in household (no)  1.7 .9 .0  5.0  431
Previous loan rescheduled (dummy)  .1 .3 .0  1.0  360
Conversation with neighbour (dummy)  .7 .4 .0  1.0  429
Farm is located in northern region (dummy)  .2 .4 .0  1.0  431
Note:  4.227  zł = 1 € in 1999. 
Source:  Own calculations.   10
hold characteristics, a dummy indicating a previously rescheduled loan (+) as illustrating the 
credit history of the borrower, and a dummy indicating the expressed habit to regularly en-
gage in conversation with neighbours (?) as a measure of village-internal information flow. 
The effect of the number of adults in the household is indeterminate since a higher number of 
household members may both increase (via increased consumption) and decrease (via genera-
tion of unearned income) M. Conversation with neighbours might reduce the probability of 
being credit constrained due to improved information availability for the local bank. How-
ever, it may also identify the borrower as little diligent in his own business, with the result of 
an increased likelihood of being credit constrained. 
In the second-stage output supply equation, the dependent variable is aggregate output supply 
measured in thousand zł. I dropped price variables, so the dependent variables are fixed fac-
tors of production, credit, and household characteristics to test the non-separability hypothe-
sis. These variables were operationalised as total land cultivated, capital stock of farm net of 
land, credit volume, and adult male and female household members. The credit variable prox-
ies the total volume of working capital loans outstanding at 30 June 1999. In addition to the 
presented variables, the second-stage equation also contains a dummy indicating location in 
the northern region and the above mentioned IMR’s. 
For the second stage, the question arises which functional form to select. Out of five criteria 
for choosing functional forms given by FUSS et al. (1978, pp. 224-225), three are of particular 
importance for this study. First, the functional form should contain no more parameters than 
are necessary for consistency with the maintained hypothesis. Second, functional forms 
should be chosen in which the parameters have an intrinsic and intuitive economic interpreta-
tion, and in which functional structure is clear. Third, the chosen functional form should be 
well-behaved in displaying consistency with maintained hypotheses such as positive marginal 
products or convexity.
2 
In the present case, the first criterion is of relevance due to the limited number of degrees of 
freedom for the second-stage regression, which is based only on a sub-sample of the entire 
database. This fact limits the possible number of explanatory variables as such, particularly if 
interaction terms as commonly used in parsimonious flexible forms should be employed. The 
chosen model specification should therefore concentrate on the most important variables 
without too much restricting the flexibility of the model. This flexibility was regarded as de-
sirable particularly for the parameters determining the shadow price of the credit constraint, 
which involves the second and third criterion of FUSS et al. My aim was to find a formulation 
sufficiently rich to allow the estimation of a function of the shadow price that accounts for 
interactions with other explanatory variables and thus to reach a maximum of economic 
meaningfulness. At the same time, I regarded theoretical plausibility as a decisive benchmark 
for specifying the model. The implication is that marginal products of credit smaller than one 
are implausible since they do not even allow repayment of the credit principal. Fixed factors 
are assumed to show positive marginal products. 
In the light of the preceding discussion, I experimented with logarithmic specifications 
(Cobb-Douglas and Translog), but both forms failed to meet the theoretical requirements out-
lined above, and also led to difficulties due to zero values for explanatory variables. Two al-
ternative specifications of the output supply equation qualified for further consideration. One 
is a variety of the Quadratic, the other a variety of the Generalised Leontief functional form. 
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Since the results of the Quadratic function were superior to those of the Leontief in terms of 
plausibility and explanatory power, only the former are presented in the following. 
In all estimations, observations with missing values were skipped. Sample design was not 
taken into account, i.e. the sample was treated as if it were a simple random sample. Since 
stratification potentially improves the precision of estimations (DEATON 1997), this decision 
should have no negative implications. 
4  RESULTS 
The presentation of the empirical results follows the discussion in the preceding chapter. Af-
ter displaying the estimated regression equations, I go on to show the resulting shadow price 
functions. Finally, I present the results of the statistical tests of credit rationing. 
4.1  Probability of being credit constrained 
The results of the Probit model are shown in Table 3. Three out of six explanatory variables 
are significant at least at the five percent level, significance of the other three is weaker. All 
coefficients have the expected sign. The key indicators of collateralisable wealth suggest that 
collateral is of major importance as a determinant of credit rationing: less land in own prop-
erty as well as higher shares of rented land imply a higher probability of being credit con-
strained. According to its t-value, the amount of land rented from private persons is the most 
important determinant of credit rationing. From the household characteristics, the number of 
females is significant at less than one percent. Apparently, more women in the farm house-
hold tend to tighten the credit constraint or make the farm less creditworthy for other reasons. 
The reverse holds for men, however less significant. The weakly significant dummy indicat-
ing a previously rescheduled loan nicely illustrates the role of the credit history. The positive 
sign of the dummy on village internal information flow supports the above mentioned view 
concerning reduced diligence of the borrower. A second explanation is that better information 
about farming activities of a given borrower led the bank to the impression that this borrower 
is in fact not creditworthy. He may thus have obtained less credit than expected and conse-
quently be classified as credit constrained. The null hypothesis that all slopes of the model are 
zero as represented by the chi-squared statistic is clearly rejected. Overall, the percentage of 
Table 3:   Coefficients of Probit model: probability of being credit con-
strained 
Variable Coefficient  t-value Significance 
Total land owned (ha)  -.010 1.392  .164 
Land rented from private persons (ha)  .042 3.034  .002 
Adult males in household (no)  -.165 1.572  .116 
Adult females in household (no)  .266 2.668  .008 
Previous loan rescheduled (dummy)  .345 1.225  .221 
Conversation with neighbour (dummy)  .517 2.344  .019 
Chi-squared, significance  25.995  <.001 
Percent correctly predicted  86.600   
Observations  350.000   
Note:    Regression includes constant. 
Source:  Own calculations.   12
correctly predicted outcomes reveals a fairly satisfactorily fit of the model. 
4.2  Output supply model: shadow prices and non-separability hypothesis 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the second-stage output supply model. In addition to 
the linear variables mentioned in Section   3, the Quadratic formulation contains an interaction 
term land times capital, and the credit variable only appears in connection with land and capi-
tal. Significance and explanatory power of the model are satisfactory. Marginal productivity 
of capital and land turned out to be positive for most observations. The shadow price of the 
credit constraint, i.e. the marginal effect of credit on output, has the following formula: 
(18)  Land Capital l * 051 . * 021 . ˆ − = η , for all l. 
This formula demonstrates that the shadow price increases with increasing capital stock, but 
decreases with increasing farm size in ha, implying a ceteris paribus higher return on credit on 
capital intensively operating farms. 
A calculation of the shadow price of the credit constraint according to (18) for all individual 
credit constrained farm households revealed that 90.7 percent of all values were positive and 
larger than one, or 100 percent, and thus consistent with theory. I rejected observations with 
values below minus one and above seven (five observations in total), which resulted in the 
distribution of shadow prices as shown in Figure 1, where they are given in percent. 
The histogram shows a distribution with slightly more mass in the left tail and a mean at 
187.7 percent. On average, credit constrained farm households were thus able to yield a return 
of on average 190 percent per annum on an extra unit of credit, with principal already de-
ducted. Given an average nominal annual interest rate on credit of 10 percent in the sample, 
the presented estimations already point at substantial evidence for credit rationing. The quali-
tative separation examined above is thus supported and the extent of credit rationing can be 
quantified. 
Table 4:   Coefficients of reduced-form output supply model 
Variable Coefficient  t-value Significance 
Total land cultivated (ha)  5.884 5.391  <.001 
Capital stock of farm net of land (ths zł) .097 2.532  .011 
Total land cultivated * capital stock net of land  -.013 4.477  <.001 
Credit volume * total land cultivated  -.051 3.408  <.001 
Credit volume * capital stock net of land  .021 4.022  <.001 
Adult males in household (no)  -.185 .027  .978 
Adult females in household (no)  12.394 1.971  .049 
Farm located in the northern region (dummy)  -57.974 2.410  .016 
Inverse Mills Ratio  22.842 1.179  .239 
F-value, significance  10.350  <.001 
Adjusted R²  .667   
Observations  43   
Notes:   Regressions include constant. Equation was estimated using the credit constrained 
sub-sample. t-values are based on modified, heteroscedasticity-robust covariance 
matrix. 
Source:  Own calculations.   13
Before examining the relation between shadow price and interest rates more closely in Sec-
tion   4.3, I consider the significance of the household characteristics. Table 4 shows that the 
effect of the number of adult females in the household is in fact significant at the five percent 
level. In contrast to that, an effect of the number of adult males could not be borne out em-
pirically. Although not fully conclusive, this is additional evidence for a binding credit con-
straint that breaks separability of production and consumption decisions. 
4.3  Comparing shadow prices and interest rates 
It remains to be shown that the estimated shadow prices are in fact statistically significantly 
different from interest rates of credit. As described in Section   3.2, this is done by regressing 
shadow prices on interest rates and testing the null hypothesis of a linear relationship with the 
parameters (b1, b2) = (0, 1).  
To obtain a realistic picture of the actual interest rates farmers face, I use a modified effective 
interest rate which consists of the nominal interest rate as given in the credit contract (whether 
subsidised or not) plus additional transaction costs due to loan application and monitoring. 
Transaction costs encompass additional cash expenses as fixed in the loan contract (e.g. fees, 
collateral insurance, etc.), cash expenses for travelling to the bank, and opportunity costs of 
the time spent for the loan application. I expressed them in percentage of the average loan 
volume and added them to the annual nominal interest rate. Effective interest rates amounted 
to 12.8 percent on average. Transaction costs constitute around 20 percent of effective interest 
rates, which underlines the necessity to account for them. 
Figure 1:   Distribution of shadow prices of the credit 
constraint 
Shadow price of the credit constraint (%)






























Notes:   Shadow price net of principal repayment. Mean = 187.7; Std. 
Dev. = 147.9; N = 38. Five extreme values excluded. Solid line 
in figure shows a normal distribution based on mean and vari-
ance of the sample. 
Source:  Own calculations.   14
The results of the parameter test are shown in Table 5. The F-test strongly rejects the null-
hypothesis of equal shadow prices and effective interest rates. For the given sample of farm 
households, shadow prices of the credit constraint are thus significantly different from interest 
rates. The constant term is positive, large, and highly significant. This is substantial support 
for the thesis that credit rationing of borrowers is of major importance in the surveyed Polish 
regions. 
5  CONCLUSIONS 
The survey results show that only a minority of the observed randomly selected Polish farms 
borrowed working capital in the reporting period. However, the econometric analysis consis-
tently suggests that more than 40 percent of borrowers experienced pronounced credit ration-
ing by rural banks. For so rationed farms, credit plays a highly significant role in determining 
output. These farms display internal shadow prices of the credit constraint of on average 190 
percent net of principal. Shadow prices increase with increasing capital intensity with regard 
to land. They are significantly different from individual effective interest rates for credit that 
account for loan specific transaction costs, which are 13 percent on average. In the group of 
credit constrained farms, household characteristics could be proven to have a significant ef-
fect on output supply. This is evidence for a violation of separability between production and 
consumption decisions and thus lends empirical support to the existence of a binding credit 
constraint. 
A Probit regression was used to analyse the determinants of credit rationing. It underlined the 
crucial role of collateral availability. While a higher amount of land in own property reduces 
credit rationing, farms with more rented land tend to face a higher probability of being con-
strained. Variables indicating the credit history of the borrower and village-internal informa-
tion flow turned out to be (in part weakly) significant for the rationing status of farmers. If 
these results are taken together with the estimated shadow price functions, the following pic-
ture of credit constrained farm households can be drawn: They own less and rent more land 
than the average; they operate with a high capital intensity with regard to land, tend to have a 
poor credit history, and engage intensively in intra-village conversation. 
The policy implication of these results condenses to the statement that continuous granting of 
highly subsidised interest rates in Poland did not overcome credit rationing of farmers at all. 
Although the large majority of borrowers applied for a subsidised loan, a substantial propor-
tion of them was not able to obtain as much credit as economically justified. On the other 
hand, the internal return on credit within the credit rationed sub-sample of farmers would 
largely suffice to pay any market oriented, commercial interest rates, which were between 15 
and 25 percent in 1999. In light of the preceding analysis, a governmental subsidy on interest 
rates can neither be regarded as an appropriate instrument to achieve an efficient nor an equi-
table allocation of credit within the Polish agricultural sector. 
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Notes:   t-values in parentheses. Null-hypothesis for the F-test: (b1, b2) = (0, 1) in equation (16). 
Source:  Own calculations.   15
The results suggest that the actual causes of credit rationing are related to existing information 
asymmetries between lender and borrower, which are not altered by any interest subsidy. 
There is empirical evidence that lack of appropriate collateral increases the probability of 
being credit constrained. In addition, risk aversion of bankers who are reluctant to lend to 
previously unreliable borrowers appears to play a role as well.  
The resulting policy recommendations point in three directions. The first is to check the lend-
ing technology of Polish rural banks, i.e. the screening and enforcement procedures currently 
used to select and monitor creditworthy loan applicants. There might be a potential for more 
innovative technologies that rely less on collateral (see e.g. VON PISCHKE 1991). Furthermore, 
a general streamlining of banking procedures might be desirable, as the efficiency of the Pol-
ish rural banking system has recently been called into question (KHITARISHVILI 2000). This is 
a task for the banks themselves but also for policymakers who have to decide on the privatisa-
tion of the still government-owned Bank for Food Economy (Bank Gospodarki 
Żywnościowej; BGŻ), an important player on Polish rural credit markets. 
A second direction is to consider public measures to counteract the collateral problem, e.g. by 
a credit guarantee scheme that is more extended than the existing one. However, the little 
available information about public credit guarantees or any similar form of risk take-over by 
governments suggests that these experiments often become costly for the tax payer. With few 
exceptions, previous programmes tended to result in severe problems of moral hazard and 
increasing default rates, and caused substantial administrative costs (GUDGER 1998). After all, 
government agencies rarely possess better information about prospective borrowers than local 
banks. Expanding governmental credit guarantees might thus mean to substitute the bad by 
the worse, since default rates among Polish farmers so far have been very modest (KARCZ 
1998).  
A final direction concerns the effects of direct payments Polish producers may receive after 
EU accession. In the light of the above results, substantial liquidity effects in terms of an ex-
pansion of production can be expected for credit constrained farms. This is in contrast to the 
textbook case of supposedly production neutral direct transfers and should be taken into ac-
count by those involved in the accession negotiations. 
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